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BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

Appeal from the verdict of a District Court Jury
in and for the First Judicial District pf Box Elder County,
State of Utah, the Honorable Venoy Chrijstoffersen, presiding.
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
IN THE STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,

V

Case

NQ>

14607
-vsDAVID LEWIS MOORE,
Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged with Lhc oritur of possessing
a controlled substance with intent to distribute the same,
a violation of the Utah Cnd< Annotated § 58-37-8 (1953).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
A jury found appellant guilty as charged before
the Honorable Venoy Christofferson.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the conviction.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant was brought to trial on April 14, 1976.
Sixteen jurors were called to be questioned.

The

prosecutor was given a chance to voir dire the prospective
jurors and asked:
"Is there anything in any of your
minds that I haven't brought up that
you think would prevent you from
rendering a fair verdict in this
case?" (T-23).
Thereafter Mr. Rock, a prospective juror answered:
"I feel very strongly against
people that use or sell narcotics.
I don't know whether I could be fair
or not." (T-23).
After a brief discussion the prosecutor said:
"Okay. Wellf perhaps defense
counsel would go into this point
a little more." (T-24).
The defense counsel did not go into the point but later
challenged the juror for cause.

The trial court denied

the challenge since no foundation had been laid by the
defense counsel (T-29,30).

Mr. Rock never served on the

jury which convicted appellant.
Defense attorney asked if any prospective jurors
knew the prosecutor (T-26).

Mr. Rhodes remained silent.

Later at a lunch break Mr. Rhodes, who was then sitting
as a juror, told the prosecutor, in the hearing of the
defense attorney that he realized that he knew the prosecutor's
father (T-34).
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After that Mr. Rhodes said he was in a hurry but
the prosecutor said "Well, there is some more evidence to
be presented."

(T-3 4).

Later the prosecutor decided

not to call one of his witnesses, which appellant alleges
was an "apparent" attempt to patronize the juror (appellant's
brief p. 5).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE WAS NO ERROR COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT
IN JURY SELECTION.
Appellant challenged two jurors for cause.
trial court denied the challenges.
that decision.

The

Appellant now appeals

Respondent submits that the decision of

the trial court should be affirmed for any one of four
reasons.

A trial judge has broad discretion in which to

make decisions concerning jury selection.

Thus his

judgment should be given great weight by the appellate
court.

Second, d u n re* his voir dire of the jury, appellant

failed to ^sk any questions concerning his suspicions of
two jurors.

Thus, Y

failed to lay before the trial court

any foundation upon which to base an objection of alleged
bias.

Furthermore, the decision not to ask any voir dire

questions concerning possible bias was a strategy move
by appellant.

Therefore, any error was self-induced.
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Finally, appellant has not carried his burden on appeal
in that he has failed to show that any actual prejudice
resulted from the trial court decision*
It should be first noted that ci trial judge is
granted broad discretion in handling a trial (Barber
v, Calder, 522 P.2d 700 (Utah 1974)) and particularly
as he conducts the selection of a jury (State v. BeBee,
110 Utah, 484, 175 P.2d 478 (1946)).

The trial judge

has the prime responsibility to determine facts and to
judge the credibility of the statements made by prosective
jurors.

The judge has the opportunity of seeing the jurors,

hearing their testimony, and noting the manner and demeanor
of the jurors while under examination and thus, is
in the best position to determine whether or not a
challenge for cause is valid.

It is much more difficult

for an appellate court to make these determinations. Therefore, the judgment of the trial court must stand unless
overwhelming reasons require reversal (BeBee, supra),
which reasons are noticeably absent in this case.
Particularly/ appellant has failed to show any actual
prejudice resulting^from the lower court's decision
(see discussion, infra, on p.9

)

Secondly, appellant should not prevail on appeal
for the reason that he failed to offer any proof, to
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the trial court, that the jurors in issue were biased.
In other words, appellant failed to offer|any foundation
or basis for his challenge for cause.

Therefore the

trial court had no option but to deny the'challenge.
It is well settled that the purpose of voir dire is to
ascertain facts that may serve as a foundation for
cause challenges (State v. Taylor, 9 Ariz|. App. 290
451 P.2d 648 (1969) and Rogers v. Citizens National
Bank, (Okla. 1962), 373 P.2d 256). The prosecutor first
questioned the jury and asked if there wajs anything in
any of their minds that would prevent them from
rendering a fair verdict. Mr. Rock replied:
"I feel very strongly against
people that use or sell narcotics.
I don't know whether I could be fair
in a verdict or not." (T-23).
ftftei

some further conversation the prosecutor said:
"Okay. Well, perhaps defense
counsel would go into this point a
little more."

Then the prosecutor asked Mr. Westley:
". . .do you feel that you |could
sit on this case, base this case or
your decision in this case ilf you
were called to this jury, on the
evidence that is presented here?"
(T-25).
j
Mr. Westley replied in the affirmative fT.25).

Later,

when appellant had a chance to voir dir& he failed to
ask either Mr. Rock or Mr. Westley any questions at all
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concerning the answers they gave to the prosecutor.
In other words, appellant didn't even try to prove actual
bias to the trial court.

Respondent submits that it

is the duty of defense counsel, as an officer of the
court to investigate and bring out any prejudicial
feelings that may exist in the minds of the prospective
jurors (Roberson v. State (Okla 1968), 456 P.2d 595).
Since appellant did not attempt to show bias he failed
to lay any foundation before the court for his challenge
for cause.

Thus the court had no choice but to deny

his challenges.
Following is a transcription of the discussion
in chambers beginning at the point where defense counsel
challenges the jurors.
"MR. RENSTROM: Your Honor, I
would at this time challenge^ the
sitting of Mr. Westley, juror
number five, an3 also Mr. Rock,
juror number 15. I think Mr.
Rock is very vague about his prejudices and Mr. Westley subscribes
apparently to the same thought as
[Mr. Rock].
(Emphasis added)
THE COURT:
which one?

Now who is this,

MR. RENSTROM.
Mr. Westley.
THE COURT:

Mr. Rock and

Okay, correct.

MR. RENSTROM: He is the one that
said most of the gentlemen had
prior experiences which seemed, quite
honestly, on that part, to suggest
he might have some prejudice." (T-28,29)
(Emphasis added).
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Obviously, as the emphasised portions, supra, demonstrate, even Mr. Renstrom was not completely certain
about prejudices which the two jurors might have.
Thus, the trial court makes the following statement:
"THE COURT: Well, of course
• • • 1 expected some inquiry there
but I didnft hear anything." (T-29)
(Emphasis added).
The prosecutor then objected to the challenge on the
same grounds by saying:
"MR. BUNDERSON: Well . . . if
there is some problem, the defense counsel
is entitled to voir dire to bring out
and ask them the questions. [So far]
there is no foundation for any objection
here." (T-29) (Emphasis added)
Respondent submits that appellant had full
opportunity to substantiate his suspicions concerning
the alleged bias of the jurors, and thus to lay a
foundation before the court on which he cpould make an
objection.

Failing to do this, the trial court had no

recourse b"t to den> the challenges. A similar situation
would arise if, during the state's direct examination,
defense counsel had objected to a question without
stating grounds.

Obviously the trial judge could,

and generally should, deny the objection!.
Another reason for affirmation is, that any
error which resulted from the lower court's decision
was induced by appellant as part of his trial strategy.
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The Utah Supreme Court has recently held that an appellant
may not claim as error any decisions made by the trial
court which were invited or induced by the appellant as
part of a strategy decision.

(State v. Fair, 2 8 Utah 2d

242, 501 P.2d 107, 108 (1972), and see also State v.
Schieving, 535 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1975)).
Any criminal lawyer knows of the various strategies
available in jury selections. Volumns have been v/ritten
on the subject.

In the instant case appellant had a

suspicion that one, and possibly two
biased.

jurors may be

This suspicion was based on the jurors answers

to questions asked by the prosecution on voir dire.
Appellant knew that he could make one of two choices.
One alternative was, during his own voir dire of the
jury, to press the jurors for specifics concerning
their possible prejudices, thus laying a foundation
for a challenge for cause.

The danger however, is that

if pressed, the jurors may flatly state that they could
be fair and impartial;
deny a challenge.

then the trial court would

The second alternative would be to

not ask any questions, challenge for Cciuse, and hope
that the trial court would dismiss the jurors on the
basis of possible prejudices.
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Later, if the trial judge

denied the challenge, appellant felt he could have
another chance on appeal.
Appellant, as his trial strategy, Adopted the
second alternative.

However, there are problems with

this coure of action.

First, appellant thereby failed

in his duty, as an officer of the court, to assist the
trial judge in making a proper determination of the
issue (Roberson, supra).

Since appellant'chose not

to assist the court by laying a foundation for his
challenge, he is now precluded from complaining of any
error thereby resulting.

The error, if any there be,

is self-induced (State v. Fair, supra).

Second, al-

though he is trying to use his second chance on appeal,
there is no raoro evidence of prejudice before this court
now, than thero was before the trial court.

It still

remains that there is no foundation for a challenge.
Finally, appellant has failed to show any actual
prejudice as a result of the trial court's decision.
Without a showing of prejudice, any error must be
deemed harmless (State v. Winkle, 535 P.2d 82 (Utah
1975)).

Appellant alleges that there was prejudice claiming

that there is a possibility that he might have had a
better jury and asking this court to speculate as to
what would have happened if the trial coujrt had granted
his challenges.

Respondent submits, on the other hand,

that the question before this court is simply:
appellant tried by an impartial jury.
-9-

was

The issue is not

whether he could have had a better jury or what would
have happened

if. . . . The Utah Supreme Court

has said that it will not be convinced by "nebulous"
assertions "without any substantial, believable
or factual probative substance," such as those now
made by appellant. (Mayne v. Turner, 24 Utah 2d
195, 468 P.2d 369 (1970)).
Respondent submits that appellant has utterly
failed to show any prejudice as a result of the jury
that actually tried him.

First, there is no

claim

by appellant that he used all of his per emptories.
Many courts hold that there is no right to appeal if
a defendant fails to exhaust his peremptories (Stott
v. State, 538 P.2d 1061 (Okla. 1975), and People v.
Miller, 78 Cal. Rptr. 449, 455 P.2d 377 (1969),
cert. den. 406 U.S. 971, 92 S.Ct. 2417, 32 L.Ed.2d
672).

Therefore, this case is identical to State v.

Bautista, 30 Urah 2d 112, 514 P.2d 530 (1973), wherein a defendant challenged a jury which challenge
was denied.

When the issue was raised on appeal

the Utah Supreme Court held:
"No claim is made by the defendants
that by reason of the court's failure
to excuse the prospective juror they
were compelled to use a peremptory
challenge they miqht have used to
strike another prospective juror's
name from the list." (514 P.2d at
532.)
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Therefore the Court said:
"Defendant
fail to show that
any prejudice resulted to them by
reason of the court's failure to
grant their challenge for cause,"
(Id.).
Respondent submits that the Bautista decision is
controlling.
Ml""""1

i H PU

Secondly, there

is no claim that any biased

jurors actually sat on the jury, nor are there any

Q*

facts that could conceivably be used to support such ^
an allegation.

t^r

Therefore there is no shoeing of

actual prejudice.

Appellant has merely raised possibilities

of hypothetical prejudice and thus his conviction
should be affirmed.
POINT II
THERE WAS NO ERROR CONCERNING DISCLOSURES OF
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PROSPECTIVE JURORS AND THE
PROSECUTOR.
Appellant asvoJ all prospective jilrors if they
knew the prosecutor.

Mr. Rhodes replied negatively.

Later, at the noon hour Mr. Rhodes accosted the
prosecutor by saying that he now knew whb the prosecutor's father was, and that he hadn't knoWn before
(T-34).

**>*

The juror went on to say something to the

effect of:
" Aren't you ever going to be a
doctor, or I thought you were going
to be a doctor, or I thought you may
be a doctor or something along those
lines." (T-34) .
-11-

ft**

In a discussion in chambers, when the subject
was brought up, the prosecutor said that nothing else
had been said.

Thereafter the court denied the motion

for mistrial which appellant had made.

Respondent

submits that the trial court's decision should be
affirmed.
Appellant correctly states the law by saying
that prospective jurors must fully, fairly, and
truthfully answer all questions on voir dire examination, and must disclose any material information
which might bear on their qualifications.
question was:
answer was:

The

Do you know the prosecutor?

No.

The

Later on the juror realized that

he did know the prosecutor's father.

However, that

knowledge fails to change the fact that the juror
still did not know the prosecutor himself.

There-

fore, the juror honestly answered the appellant's
question.
POINT III
THERE IS NO PROOF THAT THE PROSECUTOR
PRESENTED HIS CASE IN A CERTAIN MANNER AS AN ATTEMPT
TO ACCOMMODATE A JUROR.
During a noon break one of the jurors said
to the prosecutor that he was in a hurry.

The

prosecutor replied, "Well, there is some more evidence
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to be presented.11

That was the end of the conver-

sation (T-34) . Later, the prosecutor decided not
to call one of his witnesses. Appellant speculates
and hypothesizes that the prosecutor decided not to
call that witness in an attempt to accommodate the
juror.

Of course, such speculation is not admissable

as grounds for appeal.

The Utah Supreme Court has

held that it is not convinced by hypothetical, nebulous,
and unsubstantiated assertions (Mayne v. Turner, 24
Utah 2d 195, 468 P.2d 369 (1970)).

Even appellant

admits that whether the prosecutor was deliberate
in his actions, " . . . can never be known. . . . "
(appellant's brief, p. 8).
CONCLUSION
Since appellant has shown no prejudice as
a result of £illeged errors, and since appellant's
arguments consist primarily of hypothetical fact
situations, respondent asks that appellant's conviction be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
23 6 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent
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